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Abstract 
This review reflects critically on why, despite its growing economic importance, artisanal and small-scale 
(ASM) – low-tech, labour-intensive mineral extraction and processing – occupies such a peripheral position on 
the economic development agenda of sub-Saharan Africa.  A poor understanding of the sector’s role in the 
region’s liberalized economies has certainly contributed to this oversight; as has the strong influence, at the 
policymaking level, of unfounded ideas and generalizations about the sector’s activities.  After providing a brief 
overview of ASM in sub-Saharan Africa, the paper explores why the sector has yet to make a mark on the 
region’s local economic development agenda and feature prominently in its poverty alleviation strategies.   
Keywords: artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM); sub-Saharan Africa (SSA); poverty; livelihoods 
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Introduction 
 
Why does artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) – the low-tech, labour-intensive mineral extraction and 
processing found across the developing world – continue to be overlooked in most international, regional and 
local economic policies and programs?  Despite surfacing on the international development agenda over four 
decades ago, the sector has yet to capture the attention of donor agencies, NGOs and host governments.  
Nowhere has this been more evident than in sub-Saharan Africa, where ASM provides direct employment to 
tens of millions of people and has created innumerable economic opportunities for many millions more in the 
downstream industries it has spawned.1     
This paper reflects critically on why, despite its growing economic importance, ASM occupies such a 
peripheral position on the economic development agenda of sub-Saharan Africa.  A poor understanding of the 
sector’s role in the region’s liberalized economies has certainly contributed to this oversight; as has the strong 
influence, at the policymaking level, of unfounded ideas and generalizations about the sector’s activities.  A 
growing body of evidence (Barry 1996; UNECA 2003; Fisher 2007) which points to ASM having alleviated 
significant rural hardship, reinvigorated deteriorating smallholder farming activities, catalyzed the growth of 
infrastructure and reduced rural-urban migration across sub-Saharan Africa has failed to energize a donor 
agenda that continues to promote archaic policies and measures to facilitate local economic development.  After 
providing a brief overview of ASM in sub-Saharan Africa, the paper comes to grips with why the sector has yet 
to make a mark on the region’s local economic development agenda and feature prominently in its poverty 
alleviation strategies.   
  
Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in sub-Saharan Africa: A Snapshot 
 
Nearly three decades ago, the World Bank published the landmark report, Small-Scale Mining: A Review of the 
Issues (Noetstaller, 1987).  The organization relied heavily on this document for guidance throughout the 1990s, 
when several ambitious multimillion dollar mining sector reform programs and restructuring projects were 
commissioned across sub-Saharan Africa.   
Importantly, Small-Scale Mining: A Review of the Issues drew attention, for the first time, to how ASM 
could potentially be an important source of jobs.  It begins by reflecting abstractly on the economic importance 
of small-scale industries in developing countries, making the case that ‘a highly beneficial attribute of small 
enterprises for developing countries is that they are more labor-intensive than large firms and thus account for 
an appreciably larger share of recorded employment’.  It furthermore argues that ‘The same is true for small 
mining operations which frequently employ large numbers of workers in rural mining districts, where job 
opportunities are particularly scarce’ (p. 13).  The document is peppered with business vernacular, making use 
of such words and phrases as ‘entrepreneurship’, ‘business development’ and ‘small enterprise’, language which 
captures the essence of the policy mind-set at the time: namely, the view that ASM is populated largely by 
people in search of business opportunities and looking for quick returns on investment.    
The literature that has since emerged, however, provides a much more comprehensive picture of the 
sector, grounded in empirical findings collected in ASM communities.  This body of analysis establishes, inter 
alia, that – at least in sub-Saharan Africa – the sector’s activities are much more complex than the diagnosis 
offered by Noetsteller (1987). Crucially, the evidence presented in the literature over the past two decades 
suggests that poverty, not a desire to ‘get rich quickly’, is driving most people into ASM and fuelling its rapid 
expansion in all corners of rural sub-Saharan Africa. Countless studies (e.g. Banchirigah 2006; Spiegel, 2009; 
Hilson 2010; Banchirigah and Hilson, 2010) have made this link, pointing to how the structural adjustment 
programs and widespread neo-liberal economic reforms implemented across the region in the late-1970s and 
early-1980s led to the downsizing of industries, crippled smallholder farmers, and initiated a pruning of the 
public sector.  The region’s ASM economy and the downstream industries it has spawned have absorbed scores 
of otherwise-unemployed people who were adversely affected by these changes.     
To date, no comprehensive census has been carried out on ASM, so there is no clear idea on how many 
people are employed directly in the sector.  Table 1 lists ASM employment estimates for selected countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa.  Most are general projections based on surveys conducted by development agencies in 
villages, and are extremely conservative estimates overall.  Most notably, the figure supplied by the ILO (ILO, 
1999) for the size of the global ASM workforce – 13 million – may, from what little data are available, apply to 
                                                          
1
 There are countless minerals mined on a small-scale, including diamonds, gemstones, bauxite and columbite-
tantalite (Maconachie, 2009; Kamlongera and Hilson, 2011; Bleischwitz et al., 2012). The majority of ASM 
operators, however, are engaged in the extraction of precious metals and stones, although gold, being the most 
ubiquitously-occurring geologically, is by far the most popular mineral being mined.  An estimated 10 percent 
of the world’s gold originates from the ASM sector (UNECA, 2011). The paper focuses primarily on artisanal 
and small-scale gold mining. 
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West Africa alone. But it is the downstream employment which ASM creates where most of its ‘job creation’ 
takes place.  There are an estimated six downstream jobs ‘created’ per individual employed directly in the 
sector, a list of occupations which includes service people, such as taxi drivers, cooks and clothing merchants; 
semi-skilled labourers, including machine operators and repairmen; and skilled and educated groups, notably 
bookkeepers, accountants and technicians. 
The bulk of discussion on ASM to date has emphasized its negative attributes (ILO, 1999; Hentschel et 
al., 2002; Speigel and Veiga, 2010).  In addition to its activities being responsible for defacing vast tracts of 
landscape and, in the case of gold panning, releasing significant quantities of mercury pollution into the natural 
environment, operators and employees often work in hazardous and unhygienic conditions. Moreover, many 
ASM communities – including several across sub-Saharan Africa – have become ‘hotspots’ for prostitution, 
disease and narcotics consumption.  These ‘ills’ have captured the attention of journalists, government officials 
and to some extent, donors, many of whom portray ASM in an extremely negative light, in the process 
influencing and at times manipulating a poorly-informed general public.  It is now fashionable in various media 
outlets and public forums to discuss at length ASM’s problematic side: its perceived child labour problem 
(Hilson, 2008; Free the Slaves, 2013; Human Rights Watch, 2013); the ‘hit and miss’ gold panning activities 
which leave large quantities of mercury into local streams and soils (Bank of Ghana, 2003; Human Rights 
Watch, 2013); and how producing communities play host to a range of sexually transmitted diseases (ILO 1999; 
Hentschel et al., 2002).  But lost in these discussions, many of which are one-sided and superficial in their 
assessment, has been the sector’s positive impacts – namely, its contribution to employment and production. 
Perhaps more importantly, the problems which have come to be associated ASM are, in many ways, 
‘expressions’ of its perpetual informality (after Hilson, 2013).  Most ASM activities are unlicensed, and 
therefore not monitored and financed through legitimate channels.  This is particularly the case in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where, as will be explained in subsequent sections of this paper, efforts to bring ASM activities into the 
legal domain have been noticeably ad hoc.  For the region’s operators, many of whose setups are among the 
most rudimentary in the world, a lack of security of tenure has had serious implications for the environment and 
local quality of life: focusing on securing enough money for their daily needs, few likely view the very impacts 
of their activities, which the general public, donors and policymakers see as problems, as priority concerns. 
Working under very difficult conditions, the region’s artisanal and small-scale miners have, no surprisingly, 
struggled to accumulate incomes and improve their livelihoods.  Forced to secure finances through informal 
means and without access to efficient equipment, many  become trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty (Figure 
1). 
 
Figure 1: The ASM poverty trap 
  
 
Source: Hilson and Pardie, 2006 
 
Why have the region’s miners struggled to escape this trap, and what have governments and donors 
done to tackle the problem?  Moreover, why is ASM in sub-Saharan Africa in the state it is – as a largely 
informal, environmentally-degrading and characterized by poor working conditions – and how in tune are 
policymakers with the needs of individual operators and their struggles?  As the discussion that follows 
explains, donor support has failed to improve the livelihoods of the region’s artisanal and small-scale miners, 
largely because, over the course of the past four decades, a string of inappropriate sector-specific programs and 
policies have been implemented, for the most part independently of core country-level and regional development 
efforts.  Whilst the attitudes of governments and donors toward ASM in sub-Saharan Africa has changed 
noticeably over this period, failure to integrate industry concerns into major rural poverty alleviation efforts 
from the beginning explains why discussions about the sector’s needs continue to have so little traction in 
policymaking dialogues today.  
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Table 1: Estimates of ASM employment and dependents in selected African countries  
Country Directly Working in 
ASM 
Estimated Number of 
Dependents 
Angola 150,000 900,000 
Burkina Faso  200,000 1,000,000 
Central African 
Republic 
400,000 2,400,000 
Chad 100,000 600,000 
Côte d’Ivoire 100,000 600,000 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
200,000 1,200,000 
Eritrea 400,000 2,400,000 
Ethiopia 500,000 3,000,000 
Ghana 1,100,000 4,400,000 
Guinea 300,000 1,500,000 
Liberia 100,000 600,000 
Madagascar 500,000 2,500,000 
Malawi 40,000  - 
Mali 400,000 2,400,000 
Mozambique 100,000 1,200,000 
Niger 450,000 2,700,000 
Nigeria 500,000 2,500,000 
South Africa 2 20,000  - 
Sierra Leone 300,000 1,800,000 
Sudan 200,000 1,200,000 
Tanzania  1,500,000 9,000,000 
Uganda 150,000 900,000 
Zimbabwe 500,000 3,000,000 
Sources: Data extracted from Dreschler (2001), Mutemeri and Petterson (2002), and UNECA (2011)  
 
In the Beginning… 
Why, during the years following publication of Small-Scale Mining in the Developing Countries, did 
ASM fail to gain much traction in development and economic plans and policies, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa?   In hindsight, this was, indeed, a missed opportunity because the donor agenda was in transition at the 
time: the overall approach taken to deliver aid was being ‘rethought’. As Lancaster (1999) recalls, most ‘aid 
donors during the 1960s and 1970s began to deal directly with spending ministries as they prepared and 
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implemented their projects’, an arrangement which saw ‘an aid donor typically conceiv[ing] a project (often 
based on the development priorities prevailing in the donor’s capital) and propos[ing] it to the appropriate 
spending ministry’ (p. 31).  The world’s bilateral and multilateral lending institutions certainly seemed open to 
new ideas.   
Had ASM entered the dialogue at this early stage, it would have likely become a focal point in many of 
the more important development debates at the time, largely because of the very significant observations made 
in Small-Scale Mining in the Developing Countries (UN, 1972).  If elucidated further, these ideas could have 
quite easily facilitated a change in public perception toward ASM in the early going.  Notably, in addition to 
pointing out that ‘the jobs, pay-rolls, spending, taxes etc…even in the case of small-scale mining, are quite 
significant to a developing country’, this landmark document drew attention to how ‘small-scale mining offers 
the subsistence agricultural labourer an introduction to and training in a money economy without uprooting him 
from his accustomed social environment, since the employment would be local’.  Similar phenomena – 
including observations that the sector provides numerous employment opportunities, and that revenues accrued 
from its production help to nourish subsistence farming activities – were later reported in a host of documents 
(e.g. Barry 1996; UN 1996; ILO 1999), albeit rather cursorily.  Failure to substantiate, with hard data, these 
points, most of which are only mentioned briefly in the document, likely led to their immediate dismissal; they 
would not be explored in any considerable depth for another three decades.   
With no influential body such as the UN to lobby donor partners and policymakers, most government 
officials continued to view ASM as an entrepreneurial activity and little else, a position which did not mesh with 
the ideologies underpinning aid strategies.  Specifically, there was little chance of the sector receiving much 
attention at a time when Robert McNamara, then President of the World Bank, was promoting ‘integrated rural 
development’. McNamara was fixated on mobilizing African leaders to ‘lead an assault on rural poverty by 
improving agriculture’ (Eicher, 2003, p. 15), whilst simultaneously reshaping the Bank’s donor strategy to 
prioritize large-scale project development. One important manifestation of the latter, in the case of 1980s and 
1990s sub-Saharan Africa, was a liberalized large-scale mining economy propelled by foreign investment 
(World Bank 1992, Weber-Fahr, 2002). 
A small pool of ASM experts were chiefly responsible for failing to put the sector ‘on the map’ from 
the beginning.  Rather than devoting the necessary time to explore the potential role ASM could play in 
development, experts became fixated on the more mundane.  This included attempting to define ‘artisanal 
mining’ and ‘small-scale mining’ in international policy documents, in hindsight fruitless efforts which 
effectively derailed any chance of the sector gaining any currency in mainstream development dialogues.  The 
entire first chapter of Small-Scale Mining in the Developing Countries, ‘The technical and economic 
characteristics of small-scale mining’, seemed to have set the tone.  It describes the main characteristics of 
‘small-scale mining’, presenting data on production, employment and technology in an attempt to calibrate 
thinking on the sector and develop appropriate universal definitions.  The issues tackled in the chapter prompted 
UN officials to organize a series of international seminars to explore in greater detail many of these same ideas, 
the largest and indeed most significant gatherings being the International Conference on the Future of Small-
Scale Mining in Jurica (Mexico) in 1978, and Strategies for small-scale mining and mineral industries, in 
Mombasa (Kenya) in 1980.  These meetings, however, did little to advance understanding of the sector’s crucial 
livelihoods dimension, leading a number of scholars to question, several years later, both the timing of and 
decision to organize these events altogether.  Two of the harshest assessments were delivered by Jennings 
(2003), who mused over what he described as the ‘essentially futile attempts to define and compartmentalize 
small-scale mining in the 1970s’ (p. 156), and Hollaway, who rather cynically reported that experts at the time 
were meeting ‘to define what it is they were talking about’ (p. 35).   
These events were not entirely futile because they drew attention to ASM for the first time and would 
yield valuable publications which would provide a fair level of detail about the characteristics of the sector’s 
activities.  But at the same time, they did little to ignite a critical ‘re-conceptualization’ of the sector.  By 
focusing almost exclusively on the industry’s characteristics and attempting to tackle definitional challenges, 
these events would be a major disservice to ASM, distancing it even further from the mainstream global 
international development agenda.  A preoccupation with these tasks seemed to inhibit more dynamic thinking 
about the sector’s operators and activity.   
Ironically, at the time when, in the words of Jennings (2003) ‘essentially futile attempts’ were being 
made to define ASM, mining more generally was beginning to take on a very different role in development, a 
change captured in the World Bank’s landmark report, The Mining Industry and the Developing Countries 
(Bosson and Varon, 1978).  It accurately pointed out at the time that, ‘substantial benefits can accrue to a 
country from a properly structured and administered mineral industry’ – specifically, that ‘in addition to 
providing foreign exchange earnings, mining activity may produce additional revenue through taxes and 
royalties; stimulate development of depressed regions; improve the professional and technical skills of nationals; 
and, for some countries, provide a nucleus for economic development’ (p. 7).  Thus began a large donor-funded 
effort which sought to revitalize mining activities in the developing world. The exercise began in Latin America 
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which, unlike sub-Saharan Africa, had in place fairly robust mineral codes and policies.  In the late-1970s and 
early-1980s, a series of World Bank-funded projects were implemented in all corners of the region, the 
blueprints for each a reflection of the general thinking at the time: that small-scale mining was populated by 
entrepreneurs and little more than a capable business venture if properly supported.   
On the one hand, there were projects that sought to transform ASM into something that it was not, and, 
because of the growing presence of competing multinationals, could likely never become: an export-based 
industry propelled by, and appealing to, foreign investors.  Such was the case with the US$7.5 million Bolivia 
National Mineral Exploration Fund Project, 1979.  It proved to be little more than an exercise aimed at 
bolstering production at resident small-scale mines judged to be ‘rather primitive, have low productivity, and 
employ little capital and low levels of technologies’ (World Bank, 1979, p. 6), and better positioning operators 
to secure investment. It aimed to correct what was seen by Bank officials as ‘past efforts to inject capital into the 
small mining sector’ which ‘achieved very little, mostly because it was not accompanied by appropriate 
technical assistance’ (p. 7).  The monies were sought to transform the National Exploration Fund (FNEM), a 
policy mechanism established by the Bolivian Government to finance mineral prospecting and exploration 
activities, into an autonomous public development enterprise, for the sole purpose of facilitating an increase in 
small-scale mining activity in the country.   
Recognizing that ‘international mining companies…are increasingly reluctant to undertake exploration 
in developing countries for reasons of perceived political risk, as well as possible inadequate financial gains’ (p. 
10), World Bank officials were clearly encouraging the Bolivian Government to take action.  They drew 
attention to how 82 applications for exploration financing had been received from small and medium-scale 
mining companies during the 22 months prior to the proposal’s submission.  The shortcomings of such 
exercises, however, have long been highlighted: specifically, how ‘many projects to assist small-scale mining 
have failed or have not led to lasting improvements because they have treated small-scale mining as a subset of 
large, formal mining’ (ILO, 1999, np).  To its credit, the World Bank did, in fact, point out at the time that in 
many corners of the developing world, ASM ‘requires special attention when formulating policies and drafting 
mineral and fiscal legislation, when staffing the ministries, and when preparing a mining sector development 
plan’ (1978, p. 264).  But it seems that many host governments have viewed the situation very differently, 
believing that the sector could, indeed, serve as a foundation for export-led growth. 
On the other hand, there was a host of projects launched that had ASM at their core but which, 
significantly, did little to advance understanding of its importance in the rural societies of the developing world 
where it occurred, as well as its interconnectedness with other economic activities.  These projects, rather, in the 
spirit of entrepreneurialism, sought to bolster investment in the sector, and foster economic and technical 
support for activities.  One of the more illustrative examples of this was the application put forward by the 
Mexican Government to the World Bank for US$40 million (World Bank, 1980) to ‘finance the foreign 
exchange cost of a Small and Medium-Scale Mining Development project’ on the grounds that ‘Small and 
medium-size mining concerns have traditionally been the origin of large mining operations in Mexico’ (p. 18).  
The Bank was called upon to ‘provide financial and technical assistance to small and medium-size enterprises in 
the mining sector to help expand their exploration, mine development and production programs and…support 
the institutions assisting mining enterprises’ (p. 14).  Further justification for the case was based around ‘the 
fragmented and varied nature of the country’s geological resources, or high ore grades, and of the relatively low 
cost of labor which enable smaller mines to compete more or less effectively with capital-intensive operators’, 
and how ‘historically, most of the larger mining concerns had their origin in small mines which used 
increasingly larger and more efficient mineral beneficiation facilities’ (p. 9).  Such projects, however, began to 
lose favour with the World Bank toward the end of the 1970s, a time when again, officers began promoting – 
often, with reckless abandon – the organization’s newly-minted ‘big project’ development agenda.  The Bank 
was also beginning to see ASM in a very distinctive entrepreneurial light, going as far as calling for a different 
course of action, including the establishment of dedicated government-sponsored ‘mining banks’ to support 
activities:   
Small-scale mining generally has very high technical and financial risks; funding the operations is hence 
difficult and expensive. The people operating much of the small-scale sector lack technical and 
managerial skills; any upgrading of the operations therefore must be accompanied by training…By its 
very nature, medium- and small-scale mining may need a significant technical assistance input to justify 
financial support…Hence, the mining bank will have to be organized and staffed to assist in project 
preparation and evaluation, to conduct in-depth project and company appraisals, to introduce new 
managerial and financial control systems, to supervise project implementation, and to provide the small 
mine with continuing technical assistance…Confusion arises over whether the bank is a source of finance 
for sector development or a channel for government subsidies to the small-scale mining operations. To 
assume the latter is wrong. A mining bank should be a financially viable entity with a well-qualified 
staff, autonomous both financially and managerially. Recipients of loans should be creditworthy 
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companies with technically and financially viable operations and projects. [Bosson and Varon, 1978, p. 
160-161, 264] 
 
No longer in sync with the donor ‘mind-set’ or the dynamics of the emerging mining and development agenda, 
host governments were left to self-finance the small-scale component on their own.  Whilst Bank officials did 
highlight at the time the importance of ‘planning for mineral sector development [which] must be coordinated 
with the development of other sectors in accordance with set priorities’ (Bosson and Varon, 1978, p. 158), none 
of the proposals put forward in the 1970s and 1980s were very holistic in outlook.  Rather than featuring under a 
broader rural development component, these ASM projects were fairly standalone and thus frequently 
abandoned once the first implementation problems began to surface.   
The groundwork would be laid rather quickly for the ‘technical, productivity-linked approach [to 
ASM]’ that would emerge ‘in the 1980s’ (Jennings, 2003, p. 145).  It marked the beginning of an extended and 
quite unproductive period for ASM support, during which a series of one-off projects were launched that further 
cemented the sector’s peripheral position on the international development agenda. 
 
The 1980s 
In the 1980s, donor strategy experienced a major overhaul.  Emphasizing ‘big-project development’ and 
‘economic liberalization’, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund began to launch Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in a number of developing countries heavily indebted to Western banks.  In 
exchange for these loan packages, recipients were required to adhere rigidly to a series of conditionalities, 
including committing to reducing government spending and shedding labour in key public sector institutions; 
deregulating and privatizing their industries; and discontinuing subsidies and dismantling support services for 
domestic agriculture.  Sub-Saharan Africa was the principal recipient of adjustment lending, receiving most of 
the packages awarded by the Bank and the International Monetary Fund before 1981.  Lending intensified in the 
region in the 1980s and 1990s, by which time, 37 of its countries had implemented a combined 162 adjustment 
programs (22 countries are still engaged in such lending), a full 36 more than the number adopted elsewhere in 
the developing world over the same period.  Overall adjustment lending in sub-Saharan Africa now exceeds 
US$15 billion (Campbell 2001; Noorbakhsh and Paloni 2001), the changes it has ushered in helping to pave the 
way for export-based development.  Backed by hundreds of millions of dollars in foreign investment, the 
region’s large-scale mining sector and mineral exploration ‘facility’ would experience unprecedented growth 
during this period.  The rapid expansion of industrial mining has long been viewed by the World Bank as a 
catalyst for resurrecting the deteriorated but resource-rich economies of sub-Saharan Africa.  In countries such 
as Ghana, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso, a series of generous tax breaks were implemented, embodied within 
revised legislation, in an attempt to lure foreign investors (Campbell, 2003). 
During the structural adjustment period, ASM continued to be viewed peripherally in development, 
despite exhibiting all of the attributes of a sector capable of nourishing growth and, inter alia, displaying job-
creation potential and rare ability to kick-start the development of downstream industries in impoverished 
settings. Ironically, Small-Scale Mining in the Developing Countries had highlighted many of these 
characteristics.  But again, the actions taken by the United Nations and partners did little to bring these issues to 
the attention of other international donors and the NGO community: whilst the Bank was forging ahead with 
plans to overhaul Africa’s large-scale mineral economy, the UN was still trying to define ASM for its own 
purposes.  Two decades later, Jennings (2003) elaborated on the implications of this: 
Until the link between small-scale mining and poverty was highlighted in the late-1990s, neither major 
donors nor governments showed much interest in assisting it. This gave little incentive for banks and 
other organs at the local level to participate. Moreover, the assistance that was provided by donors and 
development agencies tended to go to relatively few countries, and had mixed results. Small-scale mining 
was just not high enough on the agendas of governments and international donors to attract widespread, 
and sustained, attention. [p. 146]   
 
Efforts to support the ASM sector, therefore, were undertaken outside of the main donor machinery – namely, 
the major development interventions being implemented under the auspices of SAPs.  
The literature that began to emerge at this time conveyed as much, providing little more than periodic 
updates on the sector’s production and composition.  For example, Wels (1983) examined the main 
characteristics of the sector’s production, including exploration techniques and the grade of ore operators 
typically target.  Reflecting on what seemed to be the mind-set of the day, Alpan (1986) portrayed the sector in a 
very entrepreneurial light, arguing that ‘in contrast with many other rural development schemes, small-scale 
miners generally are self-motivated and start their enterprise without government encouragement and assistance’ 
(p. 95).  Several scholars (e.g. Ali, 1986; Carman, 1987) voiced similar views but by far, the most significant 
sectoral analysis to emerge in the 1980s was Noetstaller’s (1987) Small-Scale Mining: A Review of the Issues.  
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Perhaps not realizing at the time of writing how much influence he would have on the donor agenda, the author 
galvanized the policymaking community, cementing the view that ASM was exclusively about 
entrepreneurship.  With so little recognition of the sector’s livelihoods dimension from the outset, not 
surprisingly, a number of slightly disconnected and occasionally, rather erroneous, critiques emerged, and 
continued to do so well into the 1990s.   
Governments and donors seemed genuinely confused about how to address ASM in policy.  On the one 
hand, there was evidence of experts at the time believing that the sector indeed had unique attributes and 
therefore required separate regulatory frameworks and policies, a thinking perhaps best epitomized by 
Noestaller’s (1994) “Small- vs. large-scale mining comparative profiles” (see Figure 2).  On the other hand, 
there was very little effort being made to create a ‘space’ in policy for ASM.  Failure to do so has spawned 
regulatory frameworks which do not adequately take into account the sector’s particular nuances.  Officers at the 
ILO would later reflect on the implications of this oversight, arguing that ‘many projects to assist small-scale 
mining have failed or have not led to lasting improvements because they have treated small-scale mining as a 
subset of large, formal mining’ (ILO, 1999, np).  A survey carried out by Bugnosen et al. (1998) confirmed as 
much, concluding, from a sample of 26 developing countries, that ‘the information available shows that small-
scale mining legislation is usually introduced as part of the provisions of the general mining laws of a country’.  
The authors are referring to the outputs of moves made in the late-1980s and early-1990s to draft and implement 
ASM-specific regulations, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.  During this time, countries such as Ghana, 
Zimbabwe and Tanzania had instituted separate legislative frameworks for the industry.  But whilst in these, and 
other, cases, ASM had certainly been ‘given expression by provision for the grant of specific titles’ as Kumar 
and Amaratunga (1994, p. 16) suggest, it continued to be treated very similarly to large-scale mining: as an 
industry populated by entrepreneurs.  
 
Figure 2: Small-scale mining versus large-scale mining profile 
 
 
 
Source: Noetstaller, 1994 
 
  
The laissez-faire approach employed to administer support to ASM operators in sub-Saharan Africa in 
particular mirrored the general approach being taken at the time to provide donor support.  Parsons (1996) 
offered a condemning yet accurate description of a typical ‘operationalized’ top-down strategy, which seemed to 
have permeated everything developmental:     
Traditionally, foreign ‘experts’ would play a role of ‘all-knowing’ authority.  Expatriate engineers would 
sweep onto the scene, designing bridges and other large structures, having very little contact with local 
communities.  Many of the engineer’s projects would directly benefit the local elites or foreign 
companies, often intensifying disparities between the upper and low social and economic status…Such 
conditions still exist in the Third World, but it has become clear that this type of technical assistance does 
not raise development standards. [p. 170] 
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In the case of ASM, this ‘top-down-ness’ was particularly evident in several of the earliest sector-specific 
technological support projects launched, the majority proving, quite quickly, to be inappropriate for a large 
share of targeted groups.  For example, a number of African countries, led by Ghana, began providing assaying 
services for ASM operators.  As Davidson (1993) explains, here, funding provided by the World Bank and GTZ 
in the early-1990s was used to design and install a facility in the locality of Tarkwa.  Plans were also hatched at 
this time to implement equipment leasing schemes and to construct a demonstration plant.  But in Ghana – and 
in other African countries, such as Zimbabwe, where moves were also made to provide assaying services – it 
was quickly realized that most of the groups being targeted were comprised more of the ‘dig and wash’ and ‘hit 
and miss’ variety of miner, specifically individuals who were ‘hand-to-mouth’ with no knowledge of, or need 
for, such advanced analytical techniques.  These services, therefore, would have likely only appealed to a small 
share of miners, if at all: namely, those in possession of a license, as informal, unregistered operators would 
have likely done everything possible to avoid contact with authorities over fears of potentially revealing their 
whereabouts.   
The poorly-coordinated, top-down approach taken to administer technological support was also 
reflective in the planning stages of the ‘centralized’ ore processing facilities which began to surface across the 
region in the 1980s and 1990s.  Led by Zimbabwe, with its flagship Shamva Mining Centre in the Northeastern 
part of the country, these service centres were intended as ‘one stop shops’ where miners could access a range of 
technical services, including assistance with processing their gold.  But with little knowledge of target 
populations, including much of an idea about the demand for services and the number of people in need of 
assistance, the facilities at most of these centres became rapidly stressed, unable to cope with demand – as in the 
case of Shamva – or have simply been underutilized (Davidson 1993; Peak et al. 1998; Hilson et al. 2007). 
           These interventions were made when ‘technical assistance’ was the buzzword in donor circles and 
‘Integrated Rural Development’ had become a centrepiece of African aid strategy.  But whilst the ideas 
underpinning these efforts were certainly well calibrated with the thinking at the time, because the ‘space’ 
afforded to ASM in development policy remained quite small, there was little chance for the problems 
experienced with potentially-promising interventions such as Shamva to be corrected over time or for novel 
medium-to-long-term ideas such as providing assaying services to be critically ‘re-thought’.  This was yet 
another missed opportunity for ASM because between 1973 and 1988, the World Bank had committed US$19 
billion to Integrated Rural Development Projects worldwide (Eicher, 2003).   
Whilst upon reflection, it may seem to have made sense to include ASM – or push for its inclusion – in 
these largely-agricultural initiatives, with the thinking not extending to the sector, any suggestions to do so 
would have likely encountered significant resistance from policymakers.  Even if the idea had been embraced, 
there would have been the added challenge of how to integrate it into policy.  Towards the end of the 1980s, 
when aid had become significantly less project-focused and more programmatic, monies became tied more to 
SAPs than economic performance.   Donors felt that some type of reform was in order, given that the loans 
administered in the 1960s and 1970s, including finances awarded for many Integrated Rural Development 
projects, ‘dealt essentially with technicalities and avoided major political and cultural issues’, a ‘serious 
omission [which] deepened the governance and economic crises when they engulfed Africa’ (Wamalwa, 1995, 
p. 14).  With SAPs being linked to specific changes, such as the aforementioned trade liberalization, revaluation 
of currency and privatization, and calling for reform of certain industries, including agriculture and 
manufacturing, there was little capacity for absorbing ideas concerning other economic activities such as ASM.  
This is why calls for correcting problems associated with potentially-promising interventions, such as Shamva, 
or demands that the idea of providing assaying services be ‘re-thought’ would not have attracted much policy 
attention.  
 In the absence of a robust, coordinated ‘action plan’ and adequate policy ‘space’ for ASM, a number of 
farfetched ideas were proposed.  Hollaway (1991), for example, called for small-scale miners to be employed as 
‘pathfinders’ for large companies, potentially ‘kick-starting’ and nourishing the development of industrial 
complexes.  Time, however, would reveal how inappropriate this suggestion was, underscoring even further 
how little was known about the dynamics of ASM at the time.  Throughout the 1990s, the sector’s operations 
became populated with disgruntled skilled and semi-skilled mine workers made redundant under reform, during 
which scores of state-owned large-scale operations were privatized.  Moreover, the idea of such a partnership 
did not mesh with the ‘vision’ outlined in the Bank’s blueprint for mining sector reform in sub-Saharan Africa, 
A Strategy for African Mining (World Bank, 1992), which called for the development and support of two 
autonomous segments of the mining economy.  Others tabled equally unrealistic ideas about technologies, most 
of which are far too sophisticated for target operators or have little chance of being adopted, given the level of 
mechanization in question.  Examples include the texts Small-Scale Mining: A Guide to Appropriate Equipment 
(McDivitt, 1990), and Small-Scale Gold-Mining Processing Techniques in Developing Countries (Priester and 
Hentschel, 1992).  Both prescribe a series of technologies – various loading techniques, cyanidation and 
crushing apparatuses – which millions of gold panners washing sediments along the banks of rivers across sub-
Saharan Africa would have little use for in their rudimentary operations. 
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 In summary, at a time when SAPs were catalyzing foreign investment in large-scale mineral 
exploration/extraction projects and stimulating a simultaneous ‘land grabbing’ by international mining houses in 
a region scarred by poverty, ASM was receiving comparatively little attention in policy.  In the 1990s, however, 
the attitude toward ASM would begin to change, as governments and NGOs finally began to acknowledge that 
the sector did, indeed, have a livelihoods dimension which was being overlooked.  But by this time, there was 
not much of a policy foundation to build on.  
 
The Early-1990s 
 
Questionable Technical Assistance and More Missed Opportunities 
 
In the 1990s, there was a recognizable shift in support strategies for ASM, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The decade, however, featured two very distinct periods, each of which will be examined separately.  
The first, which spanned the beginning of the decade, was effectively an extension of the 1980s, during which, 
mainly technical-oriented interventions for ASM were pursued. But this was also a time when several bilateral 
agencies began to put aside monies to support, both directly and through various partnerships, ASM throughout 
the region.  Although this assistance continued to be heavily disconnected, ideologically, from the donor 
programs launched and development initiatives undertaken at the time, it was very focused and with the right 
backing, could have had profound impacts on ASM groups.  It was not until the late-1990s, however, that the 
donor support being provided for ASM in the region began to feature a recognizable livelihoods dimension.   
The 1980s will always be remembered, in ASM circles, as a decade in which significant technical 
support was provided to operators, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.  Most of the interventions made would 
fail to have a lasting impact, targeting, once again, a group of people designers believed were rogue 
entrepreneurs.  Little had changed by the early-1990s: the bulk of sectoral support remained technical in its 
orientation, focusing mainly on improving the efficiency of operations themselves.  More comprehensive 
technical assessments of ASM did, however, begin to emerge at this time – a significant departure from the 
series of largely-nondescript essays and biased reports produced on the subject during the 1980s.  Key among 
these was Priester et al.’s (1992) analysis of gold processing technology and Hollaway’s (1993) survey of 
different small-scale mining equipment.  The latter is particularly insightful, as it highlights the potential barriers 
preventing ASM operators, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, from adopting more efficient equipment.  It also 
identifies various apparatuses the region’s miners should avoid, given the high cost and the level of technical 
expertise required for their effective operation. 
By the early-1990s, the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) had quickly become the ‘face’ of 
bilateral aid for ASM – at least in sub-Saharan Africa.  The organization was actively involved in significant 
project work in Zimbabwe and Ghana, two countries with lengthy and very dynamic artisanal gold mining 
histories.  It was a time marked by ‘the rise in importance of NGOs’, which would ‘become if not major then at 
least significant actors on the aid scene’ (Riddell, 1992, p. 65).  Plans hatched by GTZ for delivering technical 
support to ASM in both countries, therefore, had rapidly come to fruition because the organization had 
successfully forged partnerships with civil society.  In Ghana, GTZ monies were used to help finance the Small 
Scale Mining Project (SSMP), under which a series of local ASM administrative centres were established in 
areas of the country where activity was most heavily concentrated.  One significant move made with GTZ 
monies was the installation, at its flagship small-scale mining district centre in Tarkwa, of the aforementioned 
assaying facility and an accompanying technological demonstration centre (Hilson, 2002a).    
In Zimbabwe, GTZ partnered with the UK-based Intermediate Technology Development Group 
(ITDG) and supplied most of the financing for the £450,000 Shamva Mining Centre.  Constructed in 1991, 
Shamva was, as indicated, intended as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for ASM, providing processing services and technical 
advice to operators.  One of its main objectives was to reduce mercury emissions from local gold mining 
activities, which was accomplished by constructing a ball mill or centralized processing facility and ‘installing’ 
a number of mercury retorts.  The latter was achieved by first studying the available models at the time, and 
subsequently implementing the most appropriate design.2  Following this, management produced a four-page 
pamphlet, in which the benefits of using a retort were detailed and step-by-step instructions provided that 
showed how to fabricate the device using basic materials.  The leaflet was produced in English, Portuguese and 
Spanish; later translated into Bahasa and Swahili; and dispatched to the offices of NGOs and local government 
in 27 countries (Davidson 1993; Mugova 2001).   
In most cases, such interventions, whilst promising, have been short-lived, largely due to the design of 
the technologies implemented.  During the initial design phases, some effort is typically made by donors and 
                                                          
2
 A retort is an enclosed device, typically fabricated from metal, in which mercury amalgam is heated.  It 
reduces emissions of mercury considerably by ‘trapping’ fumes, a large percentage of which condense, and can 
be collected and reused. 
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partner NGOs to study existing equipment and use this analysis to assist with implementation.  With the passage 
of time, however, more often than not, it has been revealed that the data gathered were insufficient to make 
informed decisions on model types.  In Zimbabwe, it was a case of designers failing to adequately anticipate 
demand for Shamva’s services with the baseline surveys undertaken.  The Centre had initially been designed to 
support 200 miners.  But when it emerged that the milling services it was providing led to income increases of 
as much as 30 percent in certain cases and that the fees paid to miners for processed ore were linked to the final 
price at which gold was bought by the Reserve Bank, demand soon outstripped supply, resulting in many more 
miners patronizing Shamva’s services.  By the early-1990s, it became evident that the capacity of the ball mill, 
which could only produce one tonne ore/hour, was incapable of satisfying demand, forcing many miners to wait 
between three and six weeks to have their ore processed; unable to wait, most returned to the riverside, where 
they resumed environmentally-destructive panning activities.  These production problems were solely due to 
miscalculations made during the design phase, and could have been avoided altogether had initial baseline 
censuses been carried out (Mugova, 2001). 
In Ghana, it was simply a case of providing an inappropriate service.  Like Shamva, its ineffectiveness 
was a direct result of policymakers and donors failing to collect the requisite baseline data – specifically, 
detailed ethnographic information.  These data would have shown that, the group of miners being targeted were 
not entrepreneurs as was believed but rather individuals crippled by hardship who were trying to sustain their 
livelihoods.  The assaying lab, which is more suitable for a medium-scale mining sector populated by skilled 
professionals (a group that had not yet emerged in Ghana by this time), was, not surprisingly, underutilized.  
The blunders continued, the biggest debacle being the hiring of the Central Regional Development Commission 
(CEDECOM) to help deliver financial and technical assistance to small-scale gold miners.  The Ghanaian 
Government and GTZ requested for CEDECOM to make recommendations for equipment leasing schemes, 
ideas which would prove inappropriate, largely because the organisation had, up until that point, never worked 
with small-scale miners before, and therefore relied heavily on information drawn heavily the experiences of its 
staff assisting small-scale fisheries.  The government eventually abandoned the scheme, and was forced to sell 
all equipment it had purchased for lease at discounted prices (Hilson, 2002a, 2002b). 
Once derailed, these projects had little hope of getting back on track because, as indicated, ASM was 
not being given much attention in regional development strategy.  As explained by Jennings (1994) at the time, 
‘There are, regrettably, few examples of specific policies for small-scale mining that cover its development and 
operation’ (p. 11).     
 
Formalization of Small-Scale Gold Mining in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Towards the late-1980s, it had become apparent that SAPs were not facilitating development in sub-
Saharan Africa as predicted.  A wave of studies (e.g. Cornia et al., 1987; Nicholas, 1988; Mosley and Smith, 
1989; Anyinam, 1989) emerged which showed that liberalized trade, privatization and a diminished 
responsibility of the state had catalyzed very little local economic development. The gulf between the rich and 
poor was broadening, and in many cases, the latter’s situation had worsened considerably.  Moreover, and as 
confirmed by Eicher (2003) in a review of unpublished and published works, there was a sharp division in 
opinion between academics and donors at the time on which poverty alleviation strategies would best serve the 
region’s needs.   
But despite these rather worrying signs, the World Bank and IMF continued to press ahead, 
maintaining their course in sub-Saharan Africa. The former published two reports which justified further its aid 
strategy – in the process, perpetuated adjustment lending – in the region.  The first, Sub-Saharan Africa, From 
Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long Term Perspective Study (World Bank, 1989), sought to deflect initial 
criticisms of adjustment and to further rationalize structural adjustment. Then-Bank President Barber Conable 
states, in the preface, that ‘adjustment efforts must be continued and the reforms broadened and deepened’ (p. 
xi).  The report itself claims ‘that a general recovery had begun in sub-Saharan [Africa] to a great extent 
resulting from the policy reforms implemented under the umbrella of Bank-funded structural adjustment 
programs’ (p, 1459).  The second report, Adjustment in Africa (Husain and Faruqee, 1994), though slightly less 
bold in its forecasts and calls, was equally complimentary of the adjustment experience in sub-Saharan Africa, 
maintaining that ‘in the macroeconomic, trade, and agricultural sectors, the major task is to move forward with 
the current approach to policy reform’.  It furthermore outlines ‘the role that adjustment needs to play in 
improving the policy environment for the provision of basic social services and protecting the environment’ (p. 
xxi).   
Upon reflection, perhaps the decision to stick with the status quo was a deliberate strategy employed by 
donors in an attempt to buy time whilst brainstorming a new donor strategy for sub-Saharan Africa.  The early-
1990s were indeed an opportune time for the Bank and partners to ‘rethink’ their approach to the region’s 
development: it was not only a period when ‘poverty alleviation’ once again became the focal point of the 
global aid agenda but also when, as Eicher (2003, p. 20) explains, donors were open to ‘letting the flowers 
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bloom’ – specifically, ‘add[ing] new activities while cutting aid to implement them’.  The decision to ‘add but 
cut’ financial resources could be viewed as direct action taken by an increasing number of donors at the time in 
response to rhetoric about the need for ‘good governance’ in lending, particularly within the bureaucracies of 
countries being targeted for aid.  The ASM sector, however, was not one of the ‘new activities’ seen to have 
potential to contribute to economic development in sub-Saharan Africa.  This oversight was somewhat ironic: 
being an industry which, as will be explained, donors helped to ‘create’ and shape that was not seen to be a 
viable enough activity to justify its inclusion in a broadened aid agenda with poverty alleviation at its core.  
Failure to recognize, at a time when donor policy was in transition, both the economic importance and poverty-
alleviation potential of ASM, has proved catastrophic, particularly for sub-Saharan Africa. 
By the early-1990s, many more African countries, in the spirit of structural adjustment, had opened up 
their mineral economies to foreign investment.  Bank officials would present a case for liberalizing large-scale 
mining in the landmark report, A Strategy for African Mining (World Bank, 1992), calling on African 
governments to transition toward an export-based large-scale mining sector populated by foreign multinationals.  
A main issue highlighted in the document is the ‘Ghana miracle’ of gold production, despite caution raised at 
the time about it being ‘unlikely to be generalised to other countries in Africa given the specificity of Ghana's 
history of mining investments’ (Chachage, 1993, p. 97).  Bank officials would nevertheless argue that the 
meteoric boom in large-scale gold mining in the country was the result of its ‘enabling policy environment’, a 
situation which, they further contested, was brought about by its new-found ability to attract foreign investment, 
and managerial and technical expertise.  It was implied throughout the text that sweeping reforms made this 
possible, facilitating the sharp rise in gold production (from 277,000 oz in 1983, to 400,000 oz in 1989, and 
subsequently, 1,200,000 oz in 1993) experienced in the country in the 1980s and early-1990s (Chachage, 1995).  
A number of other African countries, including Tanzania, Mali, the DR Congo, Mozambique and Uganda, have 
since followed Ghana’s lead, implementing equally-sweeping reforms in an attempt to attract foreign interests to 
develop their large-scale gold exploration and mining economies.  But as will be explained, many of these 
changes were made at the expense of ASM, consequently impeding its establishment and growth in the formal 
economy of sub-Saharan Africa.    
Most of the press coverage of ASM, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, focuses on the industry’s many 
‘ills’, including its supposed child labour problem, the prostitution and HIV/AIDS widespread in the 
communities where minerals are extracted, and the environmental footprint of activities.  At the same time, very 
little attention is paid to understanding how these problems have come about, or why the industry itself is in the 
state it is and its operators struggle to mechanize and gain a foothold in the formal economy.  Significantly, and 
as pointed out earlier, the donor strategy which prevailed in the 1980s and 1990s played a heavy hand in shaping 
and fuelling the rapid growth of the ASM sector – particularly gold extraction and panning – found across sub-
Saharan Africa today, and what policymakers have come to identify it as: a labour-intensive, largely-informal, 
chaotic economy, comprised of low-tech operations and populated by rogue entrepreneurs.   
There are two aspects to consider here.  First, whilst there is little disputing that, by implementing 
SAPs and sweeping reforms, host African governments have created an ‘enabling policy environment’ for large-
scale gold mining, they have, at the same time, created the ideal policy conditions for the growth of illegal ASM 
activity.  By the end of 1995, 36 African countries had implemented rigid policy frameworks and legislation 
with the aim of legalizing the industry—a move described by Chachage (1995, p. 47) as the ‘officialization of 
hitherto illicit activities’—and/or had established sector-specific administrative and technical institutions to 
facilitate this, or were in the process of doing so (Fisher, 2007).  But the hasty enactment of licensing systems, 
often with very little consideration for the people being targeted, suddenly made ‘unregistered’ artisanal and 
small-scale miners ‘illegal’.  This was portrayed as a problem for African countries in A Strategy for African 
Mining (World Bank, 1992), likely because of the perceived inconvenience tens of thousands of artisanal 
operators would present to a government opening up its mineral economy and demarcating large parcels of land 
to foreign multinationals.  To this end, the document rather baselessly claimed that ‘Many artisanal miners are 
individuals or families who typically have no mining rights, no mine plans, and sell their product to whoever 
turns up to buy it’ (p. 42).    
Toward the late-1990s, it had become apparent that, across sub-Saharan Africa, superimposed ASM 
regulations were impeding the formalization of activities, rather than encouraging individuals to obtain licenses 
and legitimize their operations in the eyes of the law.  Officers at the ILO were among the first to reflect on 
why, pointing out in the landmark text, Social and Labour Issues in Small-Scale Mining (ILO, 1999) that:  
 
Small-scale mining is bedevilled with too many regulations that are mostly designed to constrain it and 
too few inspectors to ensure that they do.  There is therefore little incentive for small-scale mines to 
conform, particularly if the risks of being caught and of sanctions being applied are minimal. If small-
scale mining is to be encouraged to operate legally, legislation must be (at least) even-handed in allowing 
small-scale miners access to suitable land for prospecting and mining activities. It must be "user friendly" 
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as far as the issuing of permits and the granting of licences are concerned – permits that provide clear 
security of tenure for a reasonable period so that small-scale mining can become established. [np] 
 
Davidson (1993) was one of very few individuals who had the foresight, during the heyday of structural 
adjustment, to emphasize the importance of providing adequate ‘space’ in policy for ASM formalization in 
countries which have implemented reforms.   To achieve this, the author argued, ‘Governments must be 
prepared to move beyond the establishment of legal frameworks, to identify deposits and areas amenable to 
small-scale development, including the preliminary evaluation of their technical and economic viability at 
different levels of operation’ (p. 317).  The mining legislation and policies implemented under reform across 
sub-Saharan Africa, however, were not ‘even-handed’; nor did donors acknowledge at the time the importance 
of creating policy environments in which both international mining houses and licensed indigenous small-scale 
operators could flourish undeterred.  Rather, the only point of emphasis seemed to be catering to the former, a 
bias reflected in A Strategy for African Mining, which, inexplicably, called for reformed mining agendas in sub-
Saharan Africa to treat large-scale mining and ASM equally, despite the two being very different in 
composition:          
 
Much of the mining legislation enacted in African countries since independence envisages that ‘small-
scale mining’ will be reserved for citizens or local companies while ‘large-scale mining’ will be the 
province of state mining corporations or large foreign mining companies…There is no good reason to 
create differential access to mineral rights for different classes of mining investor. A state mining 
enterprise should compete on the same terms as a privately-owned company, foreign on the same terms 
as national, large companies under the same broad rules as small ones. [p. 22] 
 
Throughout sub-Saharan Africa, reforms, manifested as overhauled investment codes and legislation, would 
both insulate and incubate large-scale mining activity, which would experience unprecedented growth over the 
course of the decade but rather problematically, taking the form of resource ‘enclaves’ disconnected from wider 
society (see Ferguson, 2005; Ackah-Baidoo, 2012).  Formalized ASM activity, however, would grow at a 
comparatively pedestrian rate, its operators struggling to mobilize the funds needed to secure the requisite 
permits and viable plots in mineralized landscapes, large sections of which had been already been demarcated to 
foreign multinationals.   
As stated in A Strategy for African Mining, ‘the original colonial mining laws defined an “open” 
system which anyone who had reached the age of majority, and was of sound mind, could acquire a statutory 
right to prospect and mine’. This legislation, it further maintained, ‘was drawn up with the small-scale gold rush 
type operation then prevalent in mind and envisaged a negligible economic or technical role for government 
[and]…provided insufficient rights and obligations for both governments and investors, including inadequate 
security of tenure for investors willing to undertake the larger mining operations which gradually became 
important in Africa’ (p. 21).  Today, the opposite is true: a significant share of the revised legislation now in 
place in sub-Saharan Africa was drawn up with the large-scale, mechanized, foreign-financed operation in mind 
and provides insufficient rights and obligations for indigenous small-scale miners.  These legislative and policy 
frameworks have discouraged formalization and fuelled the growth of the illegal ASM activities found scattered 
across the region today.   
 
Structural Adjustment and the Growth of Informal Gold Mining in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 Structural adjustment has certainly fuelled the rapid growth of ASM across rural sub-Saharan Africa, 
although not in the way perhaps anticipated by proponents of A Strategy for African Mining.  Rather than 
facilitating formalization, reforms have catalyzed the expansion of the region’s informal gold mining economy, 
to which, over the past two decades, tens of thousands of people made redundant under structural adjustment 
have congregated in search of employment.   
This crucial link, however, would not be acknowledged by donors and policymakers for several years.  
Officers at the ILO were the first to make the general observation in the landmark report, Social and Labour 
Issues in Small-Scale Mining (ILO, 1999).  It states that ‘The impact of structural adjustment programmes, low 
commodity prices or drought on private and public sector employment, trading, farming and inflation has led 
many people, especially women who relied on subsistence agriculture, to seek new, alternative additional paid 
employment for a better quality of life, or more usually, just to survive’ (np).  Officials at the United Nations 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) echoed these sentiments: 
Increasing numbers of people have turned to SSM [small-scale mining] to seek alternative livelihoods. In 
many cases, this was impelled by growing economic crises, the effects of structural adjustment, 
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, which increased unemployment, mine redundancies in large mine 
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companies due to crumbling mineral prices, and decreasing rural livelihood choices, chiefly in areas 
affected by natural (mainly droughts and floods) and man-made disasters. [UNECA, 2003, p. 2] 
  
Significantly, ASM scholars (e.g. Davidson, 1993; Labonne, 1993, 1996; Noetstaller 1994), the vast majority of 
whom seemed preoccupied with the issue of formalization, also seemed to overlook how SAPs were fuelling the 
growth of informal gold mining activity, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In recent years, however, the link has been made, and quite explicitly.  Banchirigah (2006), for 
example, pulled together several illustrative but isolated examples from previous research which suggested that 
many of those made redundant followed SAP implementation in sub-Saharan Africa were, indeed, finding 
homes in the informal gold mining economy.  Among the more informative works cited were those of Dreschler 
(2001), who reflects on the situations in Zimbabwe and Tanzania specifically.  In the case of the former, it was 
pointed out that following implementation of the SAP in 1990, ‘thousands of workers lost their jobs…and many 
of the retrenched turned to artisanal gold mining’.  The author reported much of the same in the latter, arguing 
that ‘the importance of small-scale and artisanal mining in Tanzania is reflected by the fact that: it offers 
attractive employment to many people particularly from the rural community; and it resettles those who have 
lost their jobs in the cities due to the newly adopted structural adjustment programme’ (p. 140).  Similar 
phenomena have been observed in Ghana, where, as Hilson and Potter (2005) report, scores of skilled and 
educated people made redundant during a protracted period of structural adjustment, including various large-
scale mine personnel, accountants, bookkeepers, teachers and public sector workers, have turned to informal 
gold mining for their income. 
Reinforcing the policy and donor position at the time, Mohan (2000, p. 107-108) attributed such labour 
movements to ‘the lure of quick wealth’, which, the author argues, leads ‘young men [to] tak[e] up [artisanal] 
mining instead of farming’.  As explained earlier in this paper, however, recent research has shown that for 
hundreds of thousands of rural African families, this movement is not a choice motivated by ambition; it is 
rather more reminiscent of a survival strategy, given the diminished viability of farming – long their main 
source of income – in a liberalized agricultural market.  There were certainly scattered reports throughout the 
1980s and early-1990s of livelihood diversification taking place. On a general note, Weis (1983) pointed out 
how ‘They [small-scale miners] provide employment, full-time or seasonal, in depressed agricultural areas, and 
reduce the drift to towns’ (p. A19).  One of the more illustrative accounts was provided by Chachage (1995) 
about Geita, which continues to be one of Tanzania’s richest gold mining districts, in the early-1990s.  The 
author reported that ‘what is interesting is that many of the villagers who are investing in food agriculture have 
done so on the basis of profits from gold’ (p. 90).  There were certainly indications early on of there being a 
range of motivations behind people’s participation in informal gold mining – drivers which have since been 
broadly grouped as pull factors or the aforementioned lure of quick wealth, and push factors or principally 
poverty or hardship (Hilson, 2009).  Donors and policymakers, however, failed to pick up on these two very 
distinct narratives and more broadly, recognize what research conducted over the past decade has revealed: that 
the informal gold mining communities found across rural sub-Saharan Africa are comprised of a heterogeneous 
mixture of people.   
  Interestingly, today, ASM and farming are interconnected as people’s livelihood strategies have 
become increasingly more complex and dynamic. Though not a newly observed relationship (Binns, 1982), in 
response to increasing economic difficulties and, most recently, rapidly rising mineral prices, the positive link 
between the two sectors has been maintained and cemented. Indeed, even in spite of the severe dislocating 
effects of war, as shown  by Maconachie and Binns (2007) in a longitudinal study of miners and farmers in 
Sierra Leone, the symbiotic dovetailing and circulation of labour between the sectors is an integral part of rural 
livelihood strategies. The seasonality of both farming and mining results in mining being undertaken during the 
dry season, when rivers are low, and farming dominating the rainy season. Furthermore, smallholder farmers are 
able to sell surplus produce at higher prices to mining areas, and, itinerant traders who buy from the farm gate 
and deliver to the mining areas also reap the benefits from increased prices and trade. Farmers are also able to 
invest and develop their farms from increased economic returns (Maconachie and Binns, 2007; Maconachie, 
2011). As a result, complex and enduring trading and social networks have developed around this more resilient, 
capital-strong, intertwined livelihood strategy of farming and mining.  
 
Implemented by individuals who believed that small-scale gold mining was populated mainly by rogue 
entrepreneurs, the industry support packages which did surface up until the early-1990s failed to take stock of 
these dynamics.  Most – at least in sub-Saharan Africa – were highly-technical in orientation; and, as little 
emphasis was placed on studying local cultures beforehand and using this analysis to inform the design of 
assistance schemes, not surprisingly, most interventions failed to have a lasting impact.  Perhaps most 
significantly, sectoral support schemes only targeted licensed operators which, as the next section of the paper 
illustrates, explains why, despite a marked change in perception toward ASM, so few Africans would benefit 
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from the multimillion dollar industry assistance schemes that would emerge over the course of the next two 
decades. 
 
 
The mid-1990s Onward: Perpetuating a Disconnected Policy Dialogue? 
 
The 1990s is often seen as a turning point for ASM policy.  As the impacts of structural adjustment began to 
take effect, and joblessness became widespread, perspectives on ASM began to change, particularly in the donor 
community.  The first significant signs of this took place at the international workshop, the Harare Guidelines 
for the Development of Small/Medium-Scale Mining, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, February 1993 (see ILO, 1999).  
Organized by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and held more than two decades 
after publication of Small-Scale Mining in the Developing Countries, the workshop brought together experts to 
discuss in depth, for the first time in an international setting, the various aspects of ASM, specifically, its legal, 
financial, commercial, environmental and social, and technical attributes (ILO, 1999).  Its aim was to share 
knowledge of best practices and facilitate the formalization of hitherto unlicensed activities.  Importantly, the 
Harare Guidelines was the first ASM seminar which did not focus exclusively on definitions, legality and 
production, although, inevitably, discussions did, at times, gravitate toward these issues.   
Moreover, the seminar – rather strangely – was built around promoting Zimbabwe as a successful 
model for profitable ASM activity.  It seemed that the decision to host the event in Harare was based largely on 
the country having in place what was believed by many at the time to be the requisite support structures and 
legal and operator-friendly policy framework to catalyze profitable activity.  Of course, attendees, the vast 
majority of whom were industry specialists, consultants and government officers, seemed oblivious to the 
shortcomings of the soon-to-be-overrun Shamva Centre, and failed to anticipate the inability or reluctance of 
Zimbabwe’s Rural District Councils to enforce the Mining (Alluvial Gold) (Public Streams) Regulations, 1991, 
hailed at the time as landmark legislation for the sector (Maponga and Ngorima, 2003).  Moreover, as one expert 
relayed in a personal communication, ‘after the meeting we felt that a lot of precious time and energy had been 
lost with the size issue’ (Expert 1, 2013) .  Most delegates continued to ignore ASM’s poverty dimension, 
which, ironically, needed to be embraced in order to transform the sector into ‘a profitable mining activity based 
principally on the successful Zimbabwe model’, an ambition shared by many of the seminar’s attendees. 
Despite being dominated by such discussion, the meeting in Harare did generate enough dialogue about 
ASM’s social attributes to warrant a themed international meeting on the sector’s livelihood and poverty 
aspects.  In May 1995, such a seminar finally took place at World Bank headquarters in Washington DC.  The 
landmark event, The International Roundtable on Informal Mining, featured the same delegates but 
significantly, the dialogue had changed.  One expert3 reflected on the objectives of the Roundtable during a 
personal communication: 
 
The usual suspects were attending the meeting.  We were concerned by the lack of breakthroughs due 
inter alia to the transient nature of ASM (artisanal came to replace small!) and the increase of 
informal/illegal/artisanal mining-gold rush type poverty-driven and opportunity driven.  The poverty link 
became obvious to most players although some believed that entrepreneurship existed in some mining 
areas and that full legal rights should be granted: Land rights (claims) which could be transferable to 
allow for upgrading.  Claims could be used as collateral for loans…Providing good practices for mining 
co-operatives was regarded as a critical-mass-building solution (towards economy of scale).  What 
changed after that? Need to launch cross-sectoral initiatives (environmental, social, women issues), 
integrated rural development, even if many miners had a get-rich-quick mentality (usually foreigners).  
Many subsistence farmers/peasants mine during the dry season when they were idle.  This was regarded 
as an ideal set up to be strengthened.  Unfortunately its was rarely the case.  Social workers complained 
that mining was disrupting their programs and making results aleatory.  Hence the need to work with 
them to develop holistic development approaches. 
 
The reference made by the expert here to ‘poverty-driven’ requires further explanation.  It was at the Roundtable 
where the growth of ASM was associated with hardship for the first time in an international gathering.   
Delegates seemed to be in general agreement that, ‘to a large extent, informal mining is a poverty-driven 
activity’ (Barry, 1996, p. 1).  There was also discussion about some operators potentially being trapped in a 
vicious cycle of poverty similar to that outlined earlier, fuelled by, inter alia, inadequate capital investment, 
limited access to quality equipment and poor productivity.  The reference made to ‘integrated development 
projects’ and allusion to rural dwellers’ seasonality signify the change in policy thinking brewing at the time: 
namely that ASM was not just a standalone business enterprise but rather an economic activity central to the 
                                                          
3
 Personal communication, international expert (Expert 1, 2013). 
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livelihoods of diversified rural households, many with farming at their core; and, which – at least in the case of 
sub-Saharan Africa – had become increasingly important during trying economic times. 
This new ‘thinking’ was certainly reflected in the donor rhetoric during the years following the 
Roundtable.  By the late-1990s, there was – at least so it seemed – a marked and radical change in donor 
philosophy, a time when ‘livelihoods’ became a point of emphasis.  Pioneering work carried out by the NGOs 
CARE International, OXFAM and the International Institute for Environment and Development, and subsequent 
analysis undertaken by the UNDP and UK Department for International Development, led to the establishment 
of the landmark Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLA). Importantly, when applied to ASM, it drew 
attention to the imperativeness of fully understanding the inherent diversity and complexity of livelihood 
strategies and risk aversion and thus clarified the interconnectedness of mining in many livelihood portfolios.  It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an exhaustive analysis of the SLA but its emergence certainly 
reflected the shift in thinking towards a more people-centred approach to international development. Part of its 
attraction was that it captured and synthesized diverse ideas; conceptually, drew on changing views of poverty, 
recognizing the different challenges facing communities and the institutional structures which affect them; and 
made people – rather than resources, organizations or facilities – the focus of action and concern, emphasizing 
participatory action (Solesbury, 2003).     
Discussion on sustainable livelihoods eventually turned to ASM, initiated by forward-thinking 
practitioners at the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (DESA).  In 2000, DESA 
launched the US$280,000 ‘Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Livelihood: Focusing on Artisanal Mining 
Communities’ project.  Centring on the country case studies of Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea and Mali, the project 
sought to ‘produce a set of policy options and best practices, for use by government, IGOs [International 
Government Organizations] and Civil Society at the micro, meso and macro levels, that contribute towards 
poverty eradication through: a) promoting opportunities of developing alternative and complementarily 
sustainable livelihoods for those engaged in artisanal mining; and b) upgrading the artisanal mining sector to an 
economically viable activity’.4  Towards the end of the project, a workshop was held in Yaoundé, Cameroon to 
share findings and mobilize additional funding.  The main output of the workshop was the ‘Yaoundé Vision 
Statement’, an ambitious call to ‘contribute to sustainably reduce poverty and improve livelihood[s] in African 
Artisanal and Small-scale Mining (ASM) communities by the year 2015 in line with the Millennium 
Development Goals’ (UNDESA, 2003, p. 6-7).  An expert reflected on the project aims in greater depth during a 
personal communication: 
 
In 2000, we thought (I thought to be more accurate) that SLA could bring a breakthrough as institutional 
support for ASM had bogged down. On the one hand: few technical projects, and on the other: endless 
technical meetings making the same old recommendations that were too unrealistic to be implemented. 
The discussions were becoming ‘incestuous’ so to speak as these meetings were attended by the same 
group of people whose thinking lacked flexibility. Moreover, in their majority technical projects were not 
sustainable; their achievements were short-lived because no income was generated to keep the project 
going after funding stopped. If no income could be generated it proves that the sector was not 
economical. Many mining colleagues refused to face the truth. I wanted to bring something fresh, multi-
sectoral approach to the debate. As you know it is hard to break sectoral barriers, be in government or 
institutions like the World Bank, UN, DFID etc...ASM has so many facets and dimensions that it cannot 
be addressed by the sole mining dept. Rural (subsistence agriculture) was affected by shock and stresses 
and to cope many farmers resort to dig for minerals: alternative source of income. [Expert 1, 2013] 
 
One of the more significant issues broached by delegates in Yaoundé was ASM’s conspicuous absence from the 
region’s freshly-drafted Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), a collection of documents produced by the 
World Bank and IMF in the late-1990s, with inputs from host governments, as replacements for SAPs.  The 
PRSP is intended as a framework for countries approaching these institutions for loans to follow: in theory, a 
detailed document, developed with inputs from communities and civil society, which identifies key priorities in 
the areas of poverty alleviation and local economic development (after Khan, 2010). The report produced 
following the Yaoundé seminar makes several significant points regarding ASM’s oversight in the PRSP project 
in sub-Saharan Africa, including how, ‘Not surprisingly, very few Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
make reference to ASM’; that ‘Mining authorities should revisit their contribution and commitment to poverty 
reduction…[which] should go beyond the provision of increased fiscal revenues, foreign exchange earnings, and 
mining jobs – the recognized tenets of the trickle-down economic model’; and how the ‘mainstreaming of ASM 
into the PRSP process also implies poverty reduction benchmarking within mining policies’ (UNDESA, 2003, 
p. 2).  Buoyed by momentum generated by ILO officers, who again, in the late 1990s, began calling for ASM’s 
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 ‘Poverty eradication and sustainable livelihood: focusing on artisanal mining communities’ 
http://esa.un.org/techcoop/flagship.asp?Code=RAF99023 (Accessed 24 November 2013). 
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empowerment (ILO, 1999), the efforts made by DESA officials to stimulate a critical ‘rethink’ about the 
sector’s inclusion in PRSPs were timely. 
By this time, several organizations had developed their own, more dynamic, definitions of ASM, and 
continue to do so, a sign of the sector’s growing global recognition (See Table 2).  Moreover, and whether a 
coincidence or not, many of the PRSPs implemented shortly after Yaoundé did seem to portray ASM in a 
different light.  For example, Ghana’s first PRSP, An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity (IMF, 2003) reinforced 
points raised by ILO officers (ILO, 1999), arguing that ‘Current mining laws tend to disproportionately favour 
large-scale mining enterprises’ and that in order ‘To address this apparent imbalance, measures will be put in 
place to expand the scope and increase the support to the small and medium scale sub-sector with the view to 
making it the predominant means of exploiting minerals in the long term’ (p. 91).  Similarly, Tanzania’s second 
PRSP, National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (IMF, 2005), stresses how ‘There is need to 
balance the livelihood requirement of artisanal miners with the economic objectives of the large-scale operators’ 
(p. 7).   
But the discussion failed to generate meaningful action over the medium-term.  Moreover, what 
seemed, at first, to be a dynamic dialogue about ASM, would rapidly fizzle.  In the case of Ghana, the 
expectation was that the ideas tabled about ASM in An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity would be further 
developed in the country’s second PRSP (IMF, 2006), Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II) (2006 
– 2009) but the document fails to even mention the sector.  It rather reverts to core themes broached in A 
Strategy for African Mining (World Bank, 1992), stating, inter alia, that ‘Growth in the mining sub-sector [of 
Ghana], particularly gold, was largely due to substantial infusion of capital from both local and external sources 
aided by the stable environment created by the institution of policies that have insulated earnings and costs from 
foreign exchange controls’ (p. 15-16).  The subsequent PRSP implemented in Tanzania, National Strategy for 
Growth and Reduction of Poverty II (IMF, 2011), also abandons ASM and, in the spirit of A Strategy for African 
Mining, portrays large-scale activity as a catalyst for ‘kick-starting’ local economic development.  It states that, 
‘The mineral sector has a great potential to contribute to GDP if sustainably exploited and efficiently managed’ 
furthermore stressing that ‘The vast mineral deposits in the country point to a high potential of the sector’s 
contribution to growth and socioeconomic transformation’ (p. 49).  Overall, the rhetoric espoused and efforts 
made by DESA, the ILO and a small group of NGOs proved insufficient in creating up a ‘space’ for ASM in a 
complex body of donor policy machinery which, for decades, had excluded and at times marginalized the sector.  
Whilst certainly doing an excellent job of mimicking the language of the donor agenda at the time, embracing 
themes such as ‘livelihoods’, ‘pro-poor strategy’ and ‘integrated rural development’, projects and policies for 
ASM – at least in the case of sub-Saharan Africa – remained standalone, launched outside of national and 
regional-level support strategies.   
 
Table 2: Selected Definitions of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining  
ASM Definition 
 
Organization 
‘Definitions…are disputed...but broadly speaking, ASM operations exploit marginal or 
small deposits, lack capital, are labour intensive, have poor access to markets and 
support services, low standards of health and safety and have a significant impact on 
the environment’. (Buxton, 2013) 
International Institute for Environment and 
Development.  
‘…largely a poverty driven activity, typically practiced in the poorest and most remote 
rural areas of a country by a largely itinerant, poorly educated populace with little 
other employment alternatives’. (World Bank, 2013)  
The World Bank 
‘An artisanal and small-scale miner is self employed, but can also be an employee, 
working as an individual or in a family unit linked to a local community, mining 
group, co-operative, or ASM organisation. Those involved are usually poor, vulnerable 
men, women and children driven to artisanal mining for survival...[new miners 
entering the sector] scavenge for a time’. (Malder, 2011). 
Fairtrade Foundation and Alliance for 
Responsible Mining 
‘There is no formal definition for ASM, but it is broadly understood to refer to mining 
activities that are labour-intensive and capital-, mechanization- and technology-poor’. 
(ICMM, 2010) 
International Council on Mining and Metals 
(ICMM) 
‘There is no consensus on what constitutes a small-scale mining operation; neither is 
the boundary between ASM operations clearly defined. This is partly because 
definitions vary by country. Despite differences in definition, common attributes stand 
out: most miners are seriously under-capitalized, rarely operate as proper business 
enterprises and lack appropriate and modern technology’. (UNECA, 2011)  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) 
‘…[ASM] commonly represents a spectrum of activities ranging in scale from small to 
large that is generally distinguished from ‘formal’ mining by a relatively low degree of 
mechanization, high degree of labour intensity, poor occupational and environmental 
health standards, little capital investments and lack of long-term planning,...ASM is 
typically an informal and highly disorganized activity’. (Hinton, 2005)  
Communities and Small Scale Mining (CASM) 
and UK Department for International 
Development (DFID). 
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‘The majority of workers in ASM exploit small deposits in remote rural areas, from 
where it is difficult for miners to get their goods to the market. Their work is labour-
intensive, low paying, extremely hazardous, and almost always avoided if other work 
is available’. (ILO, 2003) 
International Labour Organization (ILO)  
 
‘A definition is fundamental in distinguishing ASGM from other mining activities. 
While challenging, legally recognising the many different types of ASGM that exist is 
an important tool in deciding how to address the activity and for adapting regulations 
to appropriate levels of control for different types of activity…Ultimately, the 
appropriate definition is best decided at the national level...’ (UNEP, 2012).  
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) 
‘..at [the] global level ASM still means different things to different people… 
Nevertheless, ASM operations all over the world share common 
characteristics…ASGM is usually a spontaneous self-organizing social system, while 
industrial mining is planned and centrally coordinated. Artisanal miners engage in 
mining to earn a living, while industrial mining (large, medium and small-scale) is 
driven by profit expectations...’ (SDC, 2011) 
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC) 
 
 
 
Failure to galvanize policy interest in ASM as a poverty-driven activity would contribute to the rapid 
demise of the Communities and Small-Scale Mining (CASM) platform, donors’ solution to calls for ‘a 
coordinated approach to assessing and addressing some of the problems with this subsector as opposed to a 
piecemeal approach’.5  Born out of discussions in London in 2001 on the back of the Global Mining Initiative,6 
CASM, which was initially housed at World Bank headquarters in Washington DC before moving to the DFID 
head office in London, was intended as a ‘mouthpiece’ for ASM.   The broad consensus among delegates at the 
Millennium Development Goals and Small-Scale Mining: A Conference for Forging Partnerships for Action 
(World Bank, 2005) seminar in Washington DC, 16–17 June 2005, was that: 
 
CASM, or an entity like it, is essential to ensure advocacy for the ASM sector in the international 
arena…[That]…without a CASM, it is unlikely that the ASM sector could generate enough international 
attention to attract the large donors and public advocacy necessary to improve the plight of the sector and 
those who rely on it for their livelihoods. [p. 17] 
 
The umbrella organization, however, made little progress toward achieving its intended aim of ‘developing 
policy guidelines, providing advice, disseminating best practices and experiences, raising funds and 
project/program implementation’.7  It proved to be a standalone initiative itself, failing to engineer the changes 
that need to be made to the donor machinery in order to create a viable ‘space’ for ASM.  The lack of cohesion 
among various entities across different sectors committed to making ASM work was magnified during the 
CASM years.  Moreover, the sector’s continued absence on the donor agenda put the sustainability of industry 
support measures to the test.  Its lack of stability failed to prevent the premature derailment of promising 
interventions such as the multimillion dollar UNIDO Global Mercury Project, and moving forward, could limit 
the impact of ground-breaking interventions such as the African Mining Vision.8 To claim that CASM was 
doomed from the outset may seem like an exaggeration but its dissolution was by no means a surprise, given its 
relatively autonomous existence.  Its rapid demise was brought about by a combination of factors, the most 
significant of which will be briefly reviewed here.   
First, the composition of its managerial structure seemed to be at odds with the issues being examined: 
namely priority concerns in the ASM sector.  Apart from donor officers, many of whom had not yet embraced 
the ASM-poverty narrative, the CASM advisory board was comprised almost entirely of participants from the 
large-scale mining industry, a sector with which many ASM operators – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – are 
feuding.  Despite being a time when donors were increasingly making ‘livelihoods’ the centrepiece of lending 
efforts, ‘the artisanal miner’ remained conspicuously absent from the CASM program, and became increasingly 
neglected throughout its existence, reflected most clearly in the organization’s flagship annual ‘Learning Event’.  
At the inaugural Learning Event, held in Ica, Peru, 2002, efforts were made to ‘underscore the relationship 
between miners, governments and NGOs, and to characterize contemporary beliefs on how ASM should be 
addressed, specifically in relation to sustainable livelihoods and community development’ (Hinton, 2005, p. 2).  
An estimated 25 percent of attendees were miners, a figure which would drop precipitously in subsequent years. 
                                                          
5
 www.casmsite.org  (Accessed 4 December 2010) 
6
 An international initiative, launched in 1998, by the world’s nine-largest mining companies.  It provided a 
rigorous analysis of the societal issues facing a globalizing mining sector.   
7
 www.casmsite.org (Accessed 4 December 2010) 
8
 The main aim of which was to educate small-scale gold miners about the health impacts of mercury and 
facilitate a change in practices. 
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By the 6th event in Ulan Bator, Mongolia, 2007 (Expert 2, 2013), for example, only 8.5 percent of attendees 
were miners.   
Why were artisanal miners being underrepresented at the Learning Event?  The CASM executive – 
which, rather strangely, proceeded to exclude academics and NGO officers from decision-making processes – 
was clearly still grappling with what ASM was about, as one expert explained in a personal communication: 
    
A major challenge was convincing the international development community including NGOs that ASM 
is a major development issue and depending upon how the sub-sector is approached and worked with 
could become a more positive force for rural community and regional development in the places where it 
is practiced, and that a global advocacy approach was warranted. We had the problem in the late 80s / 
early 90s with Small Mining International; and we had it again in the early 2000s with CASM. Could the 
Secretariat have been more energetic or creative in the way we approached the challenge – the answer is 
always ‘yes’. Would it have made a difference; I am not sure. [Expert 3, 2013]  
 
With CASM being sabotaged by consultants and industry people (Hilson, 2007), not surprisingly, there was ‘a 
marked shift in topic discussion from hard-core technical discussions on processing, marketing, etc., towards 
“development” type stuff like Fair Trade and certification’, a reflection of ‘the dominance of outsiders to setting 
the ASM formalisation/development agenda’ (Expert 2, 2013).  
Second, for many, CASM’s initial siting in Washington DC, at World Bank headquarters, presented a 
serious conflict of interest.  With the perpetual informality of ASM, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, being 
largely a result of World Bank intervention, specifically, the implementation of revised mining codes which 
prioritize the development of large-scale mining modelled upon recommendations prescribed in A Strategy for 
African Mining, the seed funding provided by CASM for, inter alia, geo-prospecting and census work in ASM 
communities, was little more than cosmetic.  Certain governments, for example, secured grants through CASM 
amounting to US$25,000, monies which could barely finance basic geological analysis.  This leads to a third, 
and final, factor, which is the lack of funding, overall, for the cause.  The Bank was unable – and perhaps 
unwilling – to continue financing CASM itself.  Once under the management of DFID, by which time, 
consultants and large-scale miners had completely hijacked the executive, CASM had lost what little influence it 
had.  Beginning in about its third year, the annual ‘Learning Event’ was beginning to attract more opportunistic 
consultants and curious onlookers than small-scale miners and representatives from organizations committed to 
empowering them.  By this time, requests from governments in sub-Saharan Africa for funding to assist with 
empowering and assisting ASM groups, formalizing their activities and redrafting legislation, were routinely 
denied on account of there being no available finances.  In less than a decade, CASM had morphed from a 
potentially-influential mouthpiece for ASM managed by an ambitious and energetic executive to a ‘talk shop for 
donors and industry…[which] did not serve its primary beneficiary’ (Expert 2, 2013). 
To summarize, more than four decades after entering the international development lexicon, ASM 
remains on the periphery of poverty alleviation and local economic development policy.  In the case of sub-
Saharan Africa, failure to recognize the sector’s growing economic importance has impeded its development.  
With poverty now widespread and employment opportunities scarce throughout the region, a formalized ASM 
sector could help to deliver much-needed short-term economic benefits, buying time for governments and 
donors to critically ‘re-think’ how to tackle pressing development challenges. This formalization needs to take 
place in a policy ‘space’ that enables and supports flexibility and cross-sector linkages in order for the 
dynamics, nuances and interconnectedness of the ASM sector, especially in relation to other sectors like farming 
discussed earlier, to be accounted for. To accomplish this, however, a radical reorientation in policy ‘mind-set’ 
will be needed. 
 
Concluding remarks     
 
This paper has reflected on why, despite its economic importance, ASM continues to occupy such a marginal 
position on the economic development agenda of sub-Saharan Africa.  A poor understanding of the sector’s role 
in the region’s liberalized economies has certainly contributed to this oversight; as has the strong influence, at 
the policymaking level, of unfounded ideas and generalizations about the sector’s activities.   
A review of ASM’s policy treatment over the past four decades reveals that, in the case of sub-Saharan 
Africa, moves to empower the sector’s operators and support its activities have been made relatively 
autonomously, independent of large-scale development programs.  A burgeoning body of research has emerged 
over the past two decades which points to ASM being an indispensable – and potentially, the most important – 
economic activity in rural sub-Saharan Africa but has failed to change donor and policymakers’ perceptions of 
the sector completely.  Until ample ‘space’ is created for ASM in regional economic development policy, efforts 
to support its activities and operators will continue to yield disappointing results.  
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